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THE REMEDIAL EFFICACY OF NLRB
REMEDIES IN JOY SILK CASES
Benjamin Wolkinsont
Most employers today respect the right of unions to organize and
bargain collectively. However, a minority of employers resist union
organizational efforts by illegal means. In a Joy Silk case,' a common
example of such resistance, the employer refuses to bargain with a
union which has demanded recognition on the basis of an authoriza-
tion card majority and thereafter dissipates the union's majority by
engaging in additional unfair labor practices. The National Labor
Relations Board typically grants relief in a Joy Silk case by issuing a
bargaining order; this is an effective remedy in a substantial number
of cases, but in others it fails to restore the status quo before the con-
tinuing unfair labor practices. To more fully achieve the purposes of
the Labor Management Relations Act,2 the Board should formulate
and apply additional remedies.
t Ph.D. candidate at the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations,
Cornell University. BA. 1966, George Washington University; MA. 1969, University of
Chicago. The article is based on the author's master's dissertation.
The author would like to acknowledge the much valued counsel and assistance
provided him by Mr. Harry Brickman, Chief, Operations Analysis Section, N.L.R.B.,
and Professor Joel Seidman of the University of Chicago. The author also thanks the
97 union organizers and employers who participated in the telephone interviews.
This article was written before the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), wherein the NLRB indicated in oral argument before
the Court its virtual abandonment of the "good faith doubt" approach as the basis for
determining employer misconduct warranting the issuance of a bargaining order. In the
same case, however, the Court affirmed the Board's policy of issuing a bargaining order
where the employer's unfair labor practices destroyed the union's card-based majority
and precluded the holding of a fair election.
1 So named after Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
2 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964).
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I
THiE APPLICABLE LAW
The Labor Management Relations Act requires only that an
employer recognize and bargain with a labor organization that repre-
sents a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit.3 The
NLRB usually determines whether or not a union has obtained
majority support by holding a representation election, for which
either the union or the employer may petition.4 A representation
election won by the union and certified by the Board automa-
tically imposes a bargaining obligation upon the employer. Many
unions, however, first seek voluntary recognition from employers.
Having obtained authorization cards from a majority of unit em-
ployees, the union organizer meets with the employer and requests
recognition. At times he will offer the employer or a neutral third
party the opportunity to examine and check the cards against the
company's payroll records. If the employer accepts the union's dem-
onstration of its majority, bargaining can then begin.
Authorization card procedures set the stage for what may be
called a Joy Silk case. Consider the following situation. After an or-
ganizational campaign, the union succeeds in obtaining authorization
cards from a majority of the employees in the unit. Although the
union is now in a position to request recognition from the employer
as the employees' bargaining agent, the union organizer withholds
his request until he has signed up as many employees as possible. In
the meantime the employer becomes aware of the union drive and
operates swiftly. Individual employees are called into the main office
3 The applicable statutory provisions are found in §§ 9(a) and 8(a)(5). Section 9(a)
provides that
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment ....
Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section
9(a):.
4 Before the union can obtain such an election, it must demonstrate that "a sub.
stantial number of employees . . . wish to be represented." Section 9(c)(1)(A). The Board
has interpreted this provision as requiring a union to show that at least 30% of the unit
supports the union before the Board will hold an election. NRLB, RMMs AND REGULArIONS
AND STATEMENrs OF PRocEDuRE § 101.18(a) (1965). Traditionally, unions meet this require-
ment by obtaining authorization cards from at least 30% of the employees, and often
from over 50%, and presenting them to the Board when petitioning for an election.
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and interrogated as to the identity of the leaders and supporters of
the union campaign. The employer then assembles his employees
and lectures them on the possible consequences of unionization:
shutdown, elimination of benefits, and stricter work rules. The em-
ployer also notes the advantages that might result from the employees'
rejection of the union: higher wages, continued job security, and
other benefits. He culminates his anti-union campaign by discharging
suspected union leaders; alternatively, or even simultaneously, he
may establish a company union. When the union finally requests
recognition as the employees' collective bargaining representative,
the employer questions the union's majority position and demands
that the union prove its majority status in a secret ballot election.
Under normal circumstances the Board views the election pro-
cess as the best means of determining employee preferences. When
an employer commits unfair labor practices, however, the Board may
conclude that the election is no longer an accurate index of em-
ployee choice and may accept other evidence of majority represen-
tation.5 One form of this substitute procedure was legitimatized in
Joy Silk Mills v. NLRB,6 which established that an employer does
not have an absolute right to an election. The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals held that, where the employer's initial refusal to
recognize the union was based on his desire to destroy the union's
majority position rather than on any good faith doubt, bargaining
orders could be issued on the basis of authorization cards.
In Joy Silk the court also upheld a Board order requiring the
employer to bargain despite the union's loss of its majority due to
the employer's unfair labor practices. This aspect of the Joy Silk
case, however, was not novel. To remedy an employer's unlawful
refusal to bargain, the Board in its first cases established the policy
of ordering the guilty employer to bargain collectively with the em-
ployees' representative.' In issuing a bargaining order, the Board, in
effect, merely imposed upon the guilty employer his original bargain-
ing obligation. Consequently, in the routine refusal-to-bargain cases
the reviewing courts viewed the bargaining order as an appropriate
5; One of the earlier cases wherein the Board expressed this principle was Artcraft
Hosiery Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 333 (1948).
6 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951). The Board has also
accepted as evidence of a union's majority an employer poll in which an employee
majority voted for the union and a strike by a majority of employees in the unit following
the employer's refusal to bargain.
7 See, e.g., Consumers' Research, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 57 (1936); Agwilines, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B.
1, modified, 87 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1936); Canton Enameling & Stamping Co., I N.L.R.B.
402 (1986); Harbor Boat Bldg. Co., I N.L.R.B. 349 (1986).
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remedy." The Board, however, was soon faced with more serious re-
fusal-to-bargain situations in which the appropriateness of the bar-
gaining order was challenged. In the litigated unfair labor practice
case, there arose an inevitable delay between the commission of the
employer's illegal acts and the NLRB decision. During this period,
and generally as a result of the employer's violations, the union could
lose its majority. The appropriateness of the bargaining order as a
remedy had previously been challenged on the ground that the union
had lost its majority, since under such circumstances a bargaining
order contravened the wishes of a majority who no longer supported
the union.
In Bradford Dyeing Association the employer refused to bar-
gain and then dissipated the union's majority by discharging union
supporters and establishing a company-dominated union. The Board
ordered the employer to bargain nonetheless; it realized that not to
require the employer to bargain would be to reward him for his
illegal acts and would render the Act's objectives unenforceable. 10
The Board rejected the argument that a bargaining order under
such conditions imposes a bargaining agent upon an unwilling em-
ployee majority. It pointed out that the shift away from the union
had been forced rather than voluntary; consequently, the only way
to safeguard the organizational rights of the majority was to restore,
as bargaining agent, the union that the majority had legitimately
selected."1
Bradford clearly established the Board's authority to issue bar-
gaining orders in cases where the union's majority was destroyed by
the employer's unfair labor practices. Still undetermined, however,
was the scope of the Board's remedial authority in situations where
other factors seemingly unrelated to the employer's refusal to bargain
contributed to the dissipation of the union's majority. In Franks
8 Jeffrey-DeWitt Insulator Co. v. NLRB, 91 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1937); Agwilines, Inc.
v. NLRB, 87 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1936).
9 4 N.L.R.B. 604 (1937), vacated in part and not enforced, 106 F.2d 151 (Ist Cir.
1939), rev'd, 310 U.S. 318 (1940).
10 [r]o refrain from ordering the respondent to bargain collectively with the
T[extile] W[orkers] O[perating] C[ommittee], would be to hold that the obliga-
tion of one subdivision of the Act may be evaded by the successful violation of
another; that the freely expressed wishes of the majority of the employees may
be destroyed if the employer brings to bear sufficient interference, restraint, and
coercion to undermine the representatives' majority support. We cannot permit
the purposes of the Act to be thus circumvented.
4 N.L.R.B. at 618.
11 Id. at 616-17.
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Brothers Company,12 for example, a number of union supporters quit
their jobs during the interval between the filing of a charge and the
issuance of a complaint; most of the replacements did not support
the union, and the union lost its majority. The employer contended
that a bargaining order was unwarranted on the grounds that natural
employee turnover rather than his unfair labor practices had dissi-
pated the union's majority. The Board, however, rejected this argu-
ment, holding that an employer's unfair labor practices not only
destroy a union's present majority but, by intimidating future em-
ployees, also eliminate a union's ability to obtain recruits among new
employees. The Board's objective was not to allow the existence of
secondary factors such as turnover to obscure the corrosive effects of
an employer's illegal anti-union campaign. Consequently, the Board
attributed the loss of the union's majority to the employer's violations
and issued a bargaining order on that basis, notwithstanding the pos-
sible effect of other factors.13
Thus the decisions in Bradford and Franks Brothers are the
foundation for the Joy Silk bargaining order. Joy Silk itself merely
reiterates the established precedent that an employer who undermines
a union's position by means of unfair labor practices cannot excuse
his failure to bargain on the ground that the union was no longer
the majority representative and applies it to the situation where the
union's original majority is based on authorization cards. 14
Since the Joy Silk decision there has been little change in the
Board's policy of issuing a bargaining order where the employer's
refusal to bargain, concurrent with his other unfair labor practices,
have destroyed the union's card-based majority. 5 One addition, how-
ever, has been made. In Joy Silk, the Board determined on the basis
of the employer's subsequent unfair labor practice campaign that
his rejection of the union's bargaining request was made in bad
12 44 N.L.R.B. 898 (1942), enforced, 137 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1943), aff'd, 321 U.S.
702 (1949).
13 44 N.L.R.B. at 911-12.
14 Joy Silk was subsequently upheld in all circuits. Note, Union Authorization Cards,
75 YALE L.J. 805, 811 (1966).
15 It is implicit in the Joy Silk decision that the union has two options; it may file
a refusal-to-bargain charge immediately after the employer commits unfair labor
practices, or it may proceed to an election and, in the event it loses, seek a bargaining
order on the basis of the employer's pre-election conduct. In Aiello Dairy Farms, 110
N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954), the Eisenhower Board ruled that the union must elect one procedure
or the other; having lost a representation election, the union could not file refusal-to-
bargain charges. In Bernel Foam Products Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964), however, the
Kennedy Board reverted to the pre-Aiello policy.
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faith, and a bargaining order issued accordingly. The question whether
factors other than unfair labor practices could be used to determine
bad faith was resolved in Snow & Sons, Inc.16 There the employer
consented to and participated in a card check, which demonstrated
the union's majority position, but later repudiated the results of
the card check and insisted on an NLRB election. Although the
employer had not committed any additional unfair labor practice,
the Board ruled that the employer's rejection of the union was not
made in good faith, and hence ordered the employer to bargain.17
The distinction between Snow and Joy Silk cases is more ap-
parent than real. Even in the Snow cases, where no additional unfair
labor practices are committed, the employer's delaying tactics and
evasion of his bargaining obligation can erode the union's majority
position. This is one of the factors behind the Board's issuance of
bargaining orders in such cases. The question regarding the reme-
dial efficacy of the bargaining order is the same in both types of cases.
The order to bargain is the Board's major remedial weapon
for dealing with employer attempts to destroy the union's majority
position. It should be noted that the Board's bargaining order car-
ries with it no immediate sanction; an employer's refusal to comply
forces the Board to seek court enforcement, and it is not until he
fails to comply with the court order that the employer risks serious
penalties.
Commenting on the remedial efficacy of the bargaining order in
Joy Silk circumstances, Professor Derek Bok has stated, "[s]ince an
order to bargain with the union will destroy any value to be derived
from violating the law, it provides a highly effective deterrent."'18 This
statement is open to question. A union's ability to obtain a satisfactory
contract normally depends on its bargaining power relative to that of
the employer. The erosion of the union's support within the plant
16 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962). In an
earlier case, Cuilen-Thompson Motor Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1951), enforced, 201 F.2d 369
(10th Cir. 1953), the Board issued a bargaining order on the basis of authorization cards
when the employer failed to bargain but did not commit additional unfair labor practices.
In this case, however, the Board did not examine the issue of the employer's good faith
doubt in refusing to bargain.
17 See, e.g., George Groh & Sons, 141 N.L.R.B. 931, enforced, S29 F2d 265 (10th Cir.
1963). In this case the Board accepted in full the Trial Examiner's analysis that:
The absence of good faith, then, may be manifested as well by attitudes and
conduct demonstrating a rejection of the collective-bargaining concept as by
more overt, readily discernible Section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) conduct potentially more
immediately destructive of the Union's majority status.
141 N.L.R.B. at 940.
18 Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections under the
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HAv. L. Rxv. 38, 133 (1964).
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would seem to preclude the union from securing employer agree-
ment to its bargaining objectives and, hence, make any bargaining
order of little value to the union. Consequently, to an employer
bent on crushing the union's organizational efforts, the bargaining
order would seem to be of little deterrent effect.
What, then, is the remedial efficacy of the bargaining order? It
is this question which the following pages will seek to answer.
II
FACTORS INFLUENCING A UNION'S ABILITY
TO OBTAIN A CONTRACT 9
A. Employer Unfair Labor Practices
An initial finding of this article20 is that the union's ability to
obtain a contract in a Joy Silk situation is greatly affected by the
19 There were several reasons for making the test of the remedial efficacy of the
bargaining order the extent to which unions obtained contracts following the issuance of
a bargaining order. First, this test allows for an objective evaluation of the Board's
effectiveness, since the rate at which unions obtain contracts in Joy Silk cases can be
measured against the extent to which unions execute contracts in "no prior bargaining"
cases where employers have not committed any unfair labor practices. Second, merely
observing whether or not contract negotiations followed the issuance of a bargaining order
would not accurately indicate the effectiveness of the Board's remedial process, since
an employer may emasculate a union's bargaining power by destroying its majority and
thereby prevent the union from obtaining a contract. A bargaining order in such a
case dearly fails to restore the union's position or to enable the union to bargain effectively
for its members. Furthermore, while the execution of a contract is not required by law,
"[t]he Act contemplates the making of contracts with labor organizations. That is the
manifest objective in providing for collective bargaining.' Consolidated Edison Co. v.
- NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 236 (1938).
20 The 61 cases studied here were selected from the 227 cases in which, between
July 1966 and December 1967, the NLRB ordered an employer to bargain with a union
whose majority status was premised on authorization cards. Approximately 90% of the
227 cases were of the Joy Silk variety; the other 10% were Snow-type cases. Of the 61
cases, 59 are Joy Silk cases and 2 are Snow cases.
The sample contains two elements of bias. First, selections were made to secure as
even as possible a distribution among all regions; cases from 27 of the Board's 31
regions were studied. Consequently, the sample does not reflect the size of a particular
region in terms of its normal case load but should provide a basis for analyzing the
efficacy of the Board's remedial processes on a national level. Second, a larger number of
litigated cases was selected than would have been obtained by a purely random sample.
Board data indicate that approximately 34% of all Joy Silk cases are litigated; in this
study, approximately 55% of the cases were litigated with the remaining 45% having been
settled informally. This was done to ensure that a sufficient number of litigating em-
ployers would participate in telephone interviews.
Because the conclusions put forth are based not only upon the numerical data, but
also on the observations and statements made by other researchers and by the union
organizers and employers involved in the cases, the author strongly felt that tests of
1969]
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extent of the employer's unfair labor practices. Employers may be
separated into two groups, using the scope of the unfair labor prac-
tices they have committed as the criterion. In the first group are
employers whose campaign against the union consisted of "simple"
infractions involving threats, interrogations, and promises of benefits
in violation of section 8(a)(1) of the Act only.2' The second group
includes employers who were guilty of "complex" unfair labor prac-
tices; i.e., employers who, in addition to having violated section
8(a)(1), either discharged union adherents, formed a company-dom-
inated union, or did both, in violation of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(2)
of the Act.22 Where employers commit complex violations of the Act,
violating both sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3), or sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(2), a union's ability to obtain a contract is reduced. 23
The reasons that unions face greater difficulty in obtaining con-
significance were not the necessary and sufficient criteria by which to judge their validity.
Thus, as Dr. Leslie Aspin pointed out in his study of the Board's reinstatement remedy,
the numerical results give structure to the conclusions, but the other sources are of at
least equal significance. Aspin, A Study of Reinstatement Under the National Labor
Relations Act 10 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, M.I.T., 1966). For a detailed discussion
of the methodology used in the study, see Wolkinson, Joy Silk Bargaining Orders: An
Examination of the Efficacy of NLRB Remedies in Joy Silk Type Cases 20-S0 (unpub-
lished M.A. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1969).
21 Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."
While any 8(a)(2) or 8(a)(3) violation is automatically interference or coercion and, hence,
violative of 8(a)(1), when mentioned in this study the 8(a)(1) violation will apply to acts
of interference or coercion which are independently violative of 8(a)(1). Hence, in the
case of multiple violations where, for example, the employer violates 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(3),
the 8(a)(3) issue involved is not a specification of the 8(a)(1) issue, but in addition to it.
22 Under 8(a)(2) it is unlawful to "dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization," and under 8(a)(3) to discriminate "in regard
to hire or tenure of employment . . . to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization."
23
Bargaining Success (Contracts Achieved) by Type of Employer
Unfair Labor Practice
% contracts
Type of unfair Total number Number of obtained in each
labor practice of cases contracts category
Refusal to bargain only 2a 2 100%
8(a)(1) 30 17 57
8(a)(3) 4 1 25
8(a)(1),(3) 17 8 47
8(a)(l),(2) 4 1 25
8(a)(2) 1 0 0
8(a)(1),(2),(3) 3 1 33
61 s0 49%
a These two cases are Snow cases.
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tracts when an employer, in addition to making threats, discharges
union adherents or forms company-dominated unions, are not diffi-
cult to perceive. An employer who discharges the key union supporters
in the plant strikes a crippling blow against the union, for he de-
prives the union of the "inside" leaders on whom it depends to rally
employee support behind the union.24 Their elimination leaves the
employees bereft of leadership at a time when the employer is at-
tempting to disrupt the union's organizational drive. With the loss
of these men, the union organizer must alone attempt to maintain
the employees' morale and support for his union in the face of the
company's attacks.
Furthermore, in discharging union supporters the employer dis-
plays his superior economic strength vis-A-vis the union. To varying
degrees, employees are intimidated as the danger involved in support-
ing the union is made evident. Most will be reluctant to risk their
jobs by continuing to support the union. Only one who is militantly
pro-union, or who can easily obtain new employment, will not be
intimidated by the discharge of others who supported the union.
Moreover, to achieve his objective, the employer need not even en-
gage in multiple discharges; most union organizers said that one well-
timed discharge is sufficient to defeat an organizing campaign.
The coercive effect of the discharge is intensified by the difficulty
of remedying the violation and restoring the status quo. Dr. Leslie
Aspin has shown that most employees who have been discriminatorily
discharged will either waive or reject an offer of reinstatement during
NLRB case processing.25 Some will procure other employment, while
others without work will decline reinstatement rather than work in
a hostile climate. Many of those who do return will remain for only
a few months. 26 The observations made in this study closely parallel
Aspin's findings. In twenty-three of the sixty-one Joy Silk cases of this
study, a total of fifty-four persons were discharged in violation of
Thus, in the 30 cases where the employers' violations consisted of only 8(a)(1)
infractions, unions were able to obtain contracts in 17 cases (57%). On the other hand,
in the 24 cases where the employer violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (8), §§ 8(a)(1) and (2), or
§§ 8(a)(1), (2), and (8), contracts were executed in only 10 cases (42%). Taking together
all 29 situations where the employer illegally discharged union adherents or formed
company-dominated unions, unions obtained contracts in only 11 cases (88%).
24 "Articulate and respected leaders inside the plant are vital to any campaign ...
If no potential leaders can be found, the representative had better acknowledge the
probability that he will not be able to wage a successful campaign." AFL-CIO, A GusDE-
BOOK FOR UNION ORGANMizS 5, 6 (1961).
26 Aspin, supra note 20, at 14, 15.
26 Id. at 16-17, 43.
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section 8(a)(3).?7 Only sixteen sought reinstatement. Furthermore,
in the thirteen of these twenty-three cases where no contract was
obtained, only fourteen percent of the discriminatees returned to
their original positions. On the other hand, fifty-eight percent accepted
reinstatement in the ten cases where the unions succeeded in obtaining
contracts. The failure of discharged employees to return to their
jobs cannot help but impress upon the remaining employees the
peril involved in supporting the union; as Aspin notes, it is "a dra-
matic refutation of the union's claims that it can protect the em-
ployees."2 Thus, notwithstanding the Board's bargaining order or
settlement agreement, the union organizer confronted with wrongful
discharges has great difficulty in mobilizing employee support be-
hind the union's effort to obtain a contract.
The employer's establishment of an inside union also significantly
weakens the union's ability to obtain a contract. While establishment
of these counterfeit unions was limited to eight of the sixty-one
cases, most of the union organizers involved in those eight cases re-
marked that the company-dominated union eroded employee support
for the labor union. In establishing an inside union, the employer
is ostensibly affording the employees their right to organize; he is
no longer opposing "unionism" as such and can persuasively argue
that the company union will provide the same benefits to the em-
ployees without forcing the employees to pay dues to a "stranger"
organization. The employer's arguments appeal to those lacking ex-
perience with unions; they desert the union in the sincere belief
that an inside union will better serve their interests. Others join
for fear of combatting the employer's expressed objective of forming
a company union. The employer is thus able to root out much of
the interest in the legitimate union. Consequently, despite later Board
orders requiring an employer to dissolve the company-dominated
union, and bargain with the outside union, the union organizer is
hard pressed to re-obtain support among employees.
Where the employer's violations consist merely of 8(a)(1) in-
fractions, the union can effectively combat the violations and regain
the employees' allegiance. For example, the skillful union organizer
can negate the effect of a unilateral wage increase by convincing
employees that the union was responsible for the wage gain. Similarly,
he can point out to employees that the employer's threats to dose
the plant or decrease production if they select the union as their bar-
2T There was one other case involving an 8(a)(3) violation which, however, did not
involve a discriminatory discharge; the 8(a)(3) violation in that case consisted of a
discriminatory temporary layoff.
28 Aspin, supra note 20, at 80.
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gaining agent are but typical employer bluffs. This is not to suggest'
that where only 8(a)(1) violations exist in a case the unions are al-
ways successful in recouping majorities and negotiating contracts; 29
the threat to shut down, for example, clearly intimidates employees
who will have difficulty finding new jobs. However, it is where the
anti-union employer enforces his threats with acts, such as discharging
union supporters or establishing an inside union, that the union's
chances of obtaining a contract following a bargaining order or settle-
ment agreement are most seriously affected.
B. The Stage of Case Disposition
An employer charged with an unlawful refusal to bargain with
a union has several alternative courses of action. He may settle the
case prior to a formal hearing by a Trial Examiner, or he may decide
to challenge the regional director's determination that he has unlaw-
fully refused to bargain and litigate the case. Litigation itself has a
number of steps: a case may be closed after a Trial Examiner's
hearing and decision, a Board decision and order, or a court decision
and order.
The stage at which a case is closed has a significant effect on a
union's ability to obtain a contract.30 The major factor behind this
relationship is time.31 The Joy Silk case that is settled informally re-
quires an average of 125 days for its completion. The time elapsing
29 See note 23 supra.
30
Stage of Case Disposition and Bargaining Success (Contracts Obtained)
% contracts
Cases dosed obtained for each
after: Total cases No. of contracts type of dosing
Settlement 27 17 63%
Trial Examiner's decision 3 2 67
Board order 15 6 40
Court of appeals decree 16 5 31
61 30 49%
Sixty-three percent of the cases (17 out of 27) which were settled resulted in the
execution of contracts. On the other hand, unions succeeded in obtaining contracts in
35% of the cases (only 11 out of 31) which were closed after a Board or court decision.
These findings parallel Ross's conclusion that a union's ability to obtain a first contract
decreased as litigation increased.
Of the 27 settled cases, 26 were informal settlements, and one was formally adjusted.
The only difference between the two is that a formal settlement is enforceable in the
courts. Failure of an employer to abide by an informal settlement only results in the
reinstitution of the 8(a)(5) charge and the holding of a Trial Examiner's hearing.
31 P. Ross, THE LABOR LAW IN AcriON 6 (1966).
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between the filing and closing of a Joy Silk case decided by the Board
averages 555 days. Last, a Joy Silk case which is appealed to the
courts generally takes over three years (1040 days) until it is closed.3 2
As a case is being litigated the union loses support from those who
are dissatisfied with the union's ability to achieve its promises. Union
organizers are well aware that newly unionized employees easily get
disgusted and that failure to win quick benefits often results in the
union "fold[ing] like a tent."3 3 Moreover, while the case is being liti-
gated the union cannot prevent the employer from making speeches
to captive audiences, sponsoring petitions urging employees to with-
draw from the union, and raising wages to undercut the union's
bargaining demands. 84
A further difficulty facing the union is that the employer's
unfair labor practices remain unremedied until a case is finally de-
cided. In such a situation employee support for the union, if not
already eliminated, is indeed made perilous.3 5
Time delays also frustrate reinstatement; the evidence suggests
that an employer who delays his reinstatement offer until he has
exhausted his efforts at litigation will generally succeed in discouraging
dischargees from returning." Two factors account for this success.
32 Information supplied by the NLRB.
33 B. KARsH, DIARY OF A STRIKE 63 (1958).
84 Of course, a union could bring additional unfair labor practice charges against
such an employer, but this would be time-consuming and involve a series of additional
hearings burdensome to union representatives.
35 One organizer remarked, "An employee in the litigated Joy Silk case cannot under-
stand that he has definite legal rights; in the end, he becomes disillusioned with the
union, feeling that it has dragged its feet and not tried hard enough." The union's
statement that relief is being sought from the Board or courts is of small solace to the
working man whose continued support for the union may cost him his job.
30
Number of Discriminatees Accepting Reinstatement in
Litigated Cases by Time of Reinstatement Offer
Reinstatement offered after Reinstatement offered after
Trial Examiner's decision Board .or court ruling
(4 cases) (7 cases)
No. of No. No. of No.
discriminatees accepting offer discriminatees accepting offer
1 1 1 0
1 1 3 0
3 3 4 0
3 0 3 0
1 0
6 5
3 0
8 5 21 5
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The first is that over a year may pass before a Board or court decision
is handed down. Clearly, the longer he is jobless, the greater is the
economic pressure compelling the discriminatee to find other em-
ployment. Furthermore, the discriminatee must be able to show that
he has actively sought other employment to be entitled to back pay.
Having obtained an equivalent or superior position, the discriminatee
refuses reinstatement,37 especially when following his discharge he
has obtained work in another locality. The second factor is fear of
company retaliation.38 By withholding his offer of reinstatement until
after the Board or court decision, the employer makes it patently
clear to the discriminatee that he is vigorously opposed to the dis-
criminatee's return. Few discriminatees are so bold as to return in
the face of continued employer hostility and the risk of further in-
jury.
Even normal events work against the union in the litigated case.
Considerable turnover occurs in the time taken to contest a case, and
new employees in the Joy Silk case can hardly be expected to support
a union. Moreover, the evidence indicates that turnover among union
supporters is exceptionally great. There were twenty-one litigated
cases in which unions failed to obtain contracts. Interviews were made
with the employers in seventeen of them. Twelve employers acknowl-
edged that as the case was being litigated, exceptionally large numbers
of union supporters quit. One employer remarked, "they left for
obvious reasons." Another stated that by the time the case had been
decided there was not a single union supporter remaining in the
plant. This employer commented that those supporting the union
were "in ill-repute and persuaded to leave." This high rate of turn-
over among union supporters is a clear reflection of employee de-
moralization, their fear of continued employer discrimination and
their view of the futility of the Board's remedial process.
Thus, whether an -employer settles or litigates may often be
the decisive factor in a union's ability to obtain a contract. The
passage of time associated with the litigation of a Joy Silk case operates
to destroy union majorities and demoralize union adherents. Conse-
It should be noted that the number of employees "accepting" reinstatement is the
number of those who made an initial acceptance of an offer, not the number of those
who actually returned to their prior employment. All 5 employees who accepted reinstate-
ment when it was offered following the trial examiner's decision did return, but none
of the employees who accepted reinstatement when it was first offered following a Board
or court decision returned.
37 Aspin found that two-thirds of those who refused reinstatement had obtained
other employment when the offer was made. Aspin, supra note 20, at 18-19, 24.
38 Aspin found that most discriminatees refuse reinstatement out of fear of
retaliation.
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quently, the support that a union can gather following a bargaining
order in a litigated case is often marginal; in approximately sixty-two
percent of the litigated cases studied here, the union either failed to
request bargaining or gave up after futile attempts to gain a contract.
C. Economic Power and Its Use
The Teamsters Union was far more successful than other unions
in obtaining contracts in the Joy Silk situations studied here.8 9 The
Teamsters obtained contracts in sixty percent of the cases in which
they were involved, whereas all other unions combined obtained
contracts in only forty-two percent of their cases.40 The success of
the Teamsters can in large part be attributed to their great economic
power4' and their use of that power. A desire to prevent or end a
89
Union Ability to Obtain Contracts in Joy Silk Situations
Contracts % of cases in which
Cases obtained contracts obtained
Teamsters 25 15 60
Other unions 36 15 42
61 0 49%
40
Unions Involved in Joy Silk Disputes
No. of cases
No. of in which contract
Union cases was obtained
Teamsters 25 15
I.L.G.W. 3 I
Retail Store Employees' Union 4 2
Retail Clerks 5 3
Rubber Workers 2 1
Meat Cutters 5 2
Printing Pressmen 1 1
Allied Appliance Workers 2 1
Service & Sales Employees 1 1
Amalgamated Clothing Workers 2 1
Aluminum 1 I
Machinists 4 0
Carpenters 3 1
Lithographers 1 0
Allied Industrial Workers of America 1 0
Woodworkers 1 0
61 O
41 S. R OMER, THE INTERNATIONAL
STaRurtum 2-4 (1962).
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS: ITS GOVERNMENT AND
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strike or boycott by the Teamsters induced the signing of many more
contracts than did a desire to avoid confrontation with other unions.4
Moreover, the Teamsters have a greater propensity to take strike
action 43 and strike to greater effect than other unions. A few examples
provided by employers interviewed illustrate the wide scope of the
Teamsters' power. In one case a pallet manufacturer capitulated
out of fear that a strike would prevent his merchandise from being
loaded on the waterfront and shipped overseas. A manufacturer of
concrete pipes, against whom the Teamsters had struck, signed a
contract following the refusal of craft unions to use the company's
products. In another case, a strike prevented an auto dealer from ob-
taining deliveries of new model automobiles.
Clearly, much of the Teamsters' economic strength is derived
from the strategic importance of their trade.44 Most employers rely
on a steady flow of supplies and deliveries to maintain their business
42
Execution of Contracts and Union, Economic Power
No. of cases where union
No. of cases No. of economic power induced
involved contracts employers to sign contract
Teamsters 25, 15 10
Other unions 36 12a 4
a A total of 27 of the 30 employers who signed contracts were interviewed. Three
employers who signed contracts with non-Teamsters unions could not be contacted. This
accounts for the reduced number of non-Teamsters contracts indicated in the table. The
employer statements were checked against union responses as to what factors enable them
to obtain contracts. There was general agreement between the responses received from
both groups,
43
Union Strike Action and Execution of Contracts
No, of cases No. of cases
No. of in which where contract
casesa union strmck was obtained
Teamsters 21 8 7
Other unions 30 4 0
a Based on telephone interviews with 51 union organizers.
Besides acknowledging that employer unfair labor practices had eroded union support
and precluded a strike, most non-Teamsters organizers indicated that in a first bargaining
situation a strike was not the best instrument for maintaining employee support. As one
non-Teamsters organizer stated, "it leaves a bad initial impression of unionism." In
contrast, Teamsters organizers showed no such hesitancy in utilizing this weapon. Many
Teamsters organizers counseled its use as the best means of cQmbatting the Joy Silk
employers in cases where the employers' viQlations had not dissipated al union support.
44 R. LEnER, Tm TEAmsTERs UNION 264-65 (1957); RoactR, supra note 41, at 4, 5. 11.
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operations; a primary stoppage may bring economic ruin. However,
the Teamsters have multiplied their economic power by skillful use
of tactics that other unions have failed to adopt. When a union
strikes an employer who transports his own product, for example,
the union is allowed to follow the employer's trucks to their destina-
tion and picket while pick-up and deliveries are made.45 By aggres-
sively engaging in this ambulatory picketing, the Teamsters are often
able to enforce their embargo of an employer's products. The manu-
facturer of concrete pipes mentioned above, for example, acceded to
the union's demands when his delivery trucks were picketed at the
construction site with the result that the craft unions would not
handle the product. The right to follow and picket a primary em-
ployer's trucks on the secondary site is not limited to the Teamsters
Union, but the Teamsters was the only one of the sixteen unions
represented in this study that used this tactic. 48 Similarly, only Team-
sters-organized employers indicated concern with the possible curtail-
ment of their supplies or deliveries as a result of such ambulatory
picketing. Another Teamsters' method of exerting secondary pressure
on an employer is to strike the primary employer's suppliers or
customers following the expiration of an agreement between the
Teamsters and the secondary employer. Outwardly, the strike against
the secondary employer appears to be one over contract negotiations.
Behind the fagade, however, it is an attempt to force the secondary
employer to cease dealing with the primary firm.47 By extending the
area in which economic force can be placed against the primary
employer, the Teamsters local becomes less susceptible than other
45 See Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950) (Moore Dry Dock).
48 The value that the Teamsters place on such ambulatory picketing is made further
evident by the union's continued use of this tactic during the 1950's, despite its apparent
illegality as a result of the NLRB's decision in Washington Coca Cola, 107 N.LR.B. 299
(1953), enforced. 220 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1955). In this case, the Eisenhower Board severely
limited the legality of ambulatory picketing by ruling that such picketing was illegal if
the primary employer had a "permanent" place of business. According to Professors
Ralph and Estelle James, the Teamsters used this tactic in organizing the South and the
Midwest in the 1950's, the Board's ruling notwithstanding. R. JA.Ms & E. JAmES, HOFvA
AND 7=Z T sr-ns 155-56 (1965). The Kennedy Board legalized ambulatory picketing
again. In International Bhd. of Electrical WVkrs., 135 N.L.R.B. 250 (1962). it rudle that
the fact that a primary employer has a permanent place of business which could be
picketed does not render illegal ambulatory picketing which follows the Moore Dry Dock
rules.
47 Professor James discloses that in the central and southern states. Teamsters
locals insist on open-ended grievance procedures which enable them to strike when a
grievance is not mutually resolved. Thus a strike ostensibly over a grievance is another
mechanism of forcing a neutral employer to cease dealing with a primary employer. R.
James & E. James, Hoifa's Leverage Techniques in Bargaining, INnusnaLs. Rn.AxroNs,
Oct. 1963. at 83.
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unions to destruction through employer unfair labor practices. The
bargaining power of the local is not based entirely on its support
within the plant; even if an employer's violations dissipate the union's
majority position, the union can force the employer to reach a settle-
ment by blocking shipment of his supplies and deliveries.
The financial and human resources of the Teamsters Union are
also significant factors in its success. When an employer's unfair labor
practices destroy the union's majority the organizer must reorganize
the plant. Former union adherents must be reconvinced that their
support of the union will bring tangible economic gains and that they
have vindicable bargaining rights. New employees must also be sold on
the benefits of unionization. This often involves an entirely new or-
ganizing campaign with meetings, posters, letters, and telephone calls.
The resources of many unions, however, are limited,48 and the Joy Silk
plant tends to be small. 49 At times a union will decide against invest-
ing additional funds and manpower in an attempt to organize only a
few workers.
D. Bargaining Unit Size
There appears to be little correlation between unit size and a
union's ability to obtain a contract;5 0 union organizers frequently
48 An organizer for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers acknowledged that limited
finandal resources forced the union to abandon its bargaining efforts. The Machinists
Union has only 3 organizers in Arkansas and less than that in Idaho. The Rubber
Workers have a very small organizing staff responsible for 11 southern states. Additionally,
an organizer's prior commitments in other organizing campaigns may prevent him from
continuing his efforts in a Joy Silk case.
49 The median unit in the 61 Joy Silk cases studied consisted of 11-20 persons.
s0
Unit Size and Bargaining Success4
Size of unit Cases Contracts
1-9 17 5
10-19 17 12
20-29 12 5
30-39 1 1
40-49 3 2
50-59 1 1
60-69 1 1
70-79 3 1
80-89 - -
90-99 - -
1O0+ 3 1
58 29
a Data for 3 cases was unavailable.
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commented that the militancy of the employees and the aggressiveness
of the employer in combatting the union were characteristics of the
unit more significant than size. The reason may be that while increas-
ing size benefits the union in some ways, it harms it in others. For
example, turnover has less effect in a large unit than in a small unit.
On the other hand, the organizer has more difficulty communica-
ting with all employees in a large unit. Some organizers suggested
that in a unit of fifty or more employees the employer can more
easily disrupt the union's organizing campaign, since it is easier to
discriminate against particular employees, spread divisive rumors,
and change working conditions to the detriment of the union's posi-
tion.
However, the data does suggest that the union's chances of suc-
cess are least in very small units consisting of less than ten persons.51
In such cases the discharge or voluntary quitting of one or two union
supporters or the hiring of one or two men unsympathetic to the
union can drastically change the union's position in the unit. Further-
more, small employers often have strong personal relationships with
their employees and can exert direct pressure on them to repudiate
the union.
One further observation can be made regarding the relationship
between unit size and the occurrence of Joy Silk cases: the Joy Silk
case seems more symptomatic of the very small employer than other
employer unfair labor practice cases. Approximately eighty percent of
the cases studied here involved units consisting of fewer than thirty
employees. Board data indicate that its employer unfair labor practice
caseload is not so heavily dominated by cases arising in very small
business establishments: only 41.3 percent of employer unfair labor
practice cases closed during fiscal year 1966 involved units of less
than thirty employees.52 This concentration of Joy Silk cases among
smaller employers may, in part, be attributed to the greater fear
among such employers of the consequences of unionization and to
their tendency to view unionization as an act of betrayal by their em-
ployees.53
51 Id.
52 31 NLRB ANN. REP. 220, Table 18 (July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966).
53 J. BLACK & J. PicCoL, SUCCESSFUL LABOR RELATIONS FOR SwAx.L BUSINESS 103, 104
(1953).
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E. Size of the Union's Original Majority
There similarly seems to be little correlation between the union's
original majority status and the union's ability to gain a contract. 4
The evidence indicates that a union's chances of executing a contract
are not any greater where the union had originally signed up as many
as ninety percent of all employees in the appropriate unit. Union or-
ganizers as a group acknowledged that such other factors as degree of
employer unfair labor practices, extent of litigation, and the union's
economic and financial resources were the most significant elements
determining a union's ability to obtain a contract in a Joy Silk case.
F. Geographical Locale of the Firm
It might be expected that the employer behavior exhibited in
Joy Silk cases would be more typical of rural communities than of
larger cities or metropolitan areas. Rural areas are less unionized than
urban areas in part because of vigorous community opposition to
unions; many employers relocate in rural communities in order to es-
cape unionization. Furthermore, rural employers are in a better posi-
tion than their urban counterparts to campaign against unions by
exploiting and integrating economic, political, and community pres-
sures.r5
The data, however, indicate that the Joy Silk case is not a small-
town phenomenon: indeed, nearly two-thirds of the sixty-one cases in
this study occurred in urban areas.56 The urban complexion of these
Joy Silk cases is no doubt a result of the greater concentration of union
efforts in the industrialized metropolitan areas. Union organizing
54
Union's Original Majority Position and Bargaining Success (Contracts Obtained)
% of employees who
signed authorization 1 contracts
cards Cases Contracts obtained
50-59 14 8 57
60-69 15 8 53
70-79 5 3 60
80-89 8 4 50
90-99 15 7 47
55 M. GITELMAN, UNIONIZATION AT'ampTs IN SmALL ENTERPRIsES 46-47 (1963).
56 In this study a "small town" was defined as a city with a population of 50,000
persons or less which was not within a 25-mile radius of any city having a population of
over 50,000. Most of the cases occurring in small towns, however, involved communities
having populations of fewer than 25,000 persons.
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drives are usually responses to employee requests, 57 and the rural in-
habitant is generally more conservative and less inclined to support
a union than a city dweller.5" The greater inclination of urban em-
ployees to unionize, coupled with the greater number of potential
union members in metropolitan areas, often dictates the location of
the union's organizing efforts. Since a Joy Silk case arises only out of
an organizing campaign, concentration of union efforts in urban areas
produces a greater absolute number of urban Joy Silk cases.59 At the
same time, however, it is possible that the percentage of rural cam-
paigns resulting in Joy Silk cases is higher than the same percentage
of urban campaigns.
It might also be expected that the small-town Joy Silk employer
would have a better chance of destroying the union than would an
urban employer. As noted earlier, the rural employer can generally
mobilize far more extensive social, economic, and political pressures
than the urban employer to frustrate the union's campaign. This
condition exists in its most extreme form in those local' communities
whose economies are dominated by a single or a few large firms.60 In
such instances, a worker will be seriously concerned over the possible
loss of his job and hence more susceptible to employer coercion
designed to destroy the union's support.
It was found, however, that the rate at which unions obtained
contracts in small-town Joy Silk cases paralleled the unions' rate of
success in urban localities.61 Countervailing factors operated to bolster
the unions' chances in small towns. Where the employees are skilled,
for example, a rural employer may have greater difficulty obtaining
qualified replacements than would an urban employer. One employer
who operates a meat-processing firm in a small town acknowledged
57 In this study nearly all of the union organizing campaigns were initiated by the
employees themselves.
58 AMRICAN Assoc. OF INDUS. MANAGEMENT, GuIDEUNES TO VICTORY 23 (1966).
59 Board experience supports this thesis. According to its officials, the NLRB has
found over the years that the great majority of unfair labor practice cases occur in urban
areas, and for this reason has located its regional offices in the major cities of this country.
60 Wyle, Union Organizing Activity Under Taft-Hartley, PROCEEDINGS OF THE: N.Y.U.
vLEvENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 193-97 (1958).
61
Bargaining Success and Geographical Locale of Firm
No. of cases No. of contracts % contracts obtained
Urban communities 40 19 47
Small towns 21 11 52
6i To- 49%
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that he signed a contract because he could not secure qualified replace-
ments ii the event of a strike, and this difficulty was shared by several
other rural employers. Another countervailing element is the higher
degree of solidarity found among workers in rural areas. A strongly
unified group often remains undaunted by employer unfair labor
practices; in one case lumber workers in California's Sierra Madre
Mountains withstood the employer's violations and finally succeeded
in obtaining a contract some three years after the union had first filed
charges. Another is the occasional ability of a cohesive small com-
munity to impose its standards upon a small employer. In one case a
union's appeal to the town's civic and church leaders resulted in com-
munity pressure on the employer to settle the case; the employer set-
tled and signed a contract with the union.
Summarizing the factors that affect a union's ability to obtain a
contract in a Joy Silk case, we can sketch the following picture: A
union's chances of obtaining a contract following a Joy Silk bargain-
ing order are enhanced when the dispute is informally adjusted, the
unfair labor practices consist of minor rather than multiple violations
of the Act, the unit size is not under ten persons, and the union is
able and willing to marshal economic, financial and manpower re-
sources to achieve a contract. 62
III
EVALUATION OF THE EFFECIVENESS
OF BOARD BARGAINING ORDERS
Of the sixty-one instances studied here, unions succeeded in ob-
taining contracts following bargaining orders in thirty-approximately
forty-nine percent of all cases. The union success in these cases is
highly encouraging since, theoretically, a bargaining order in a Joy
Silk situation appears to be a futile gesture. A basic ingredient of the
Joy Silk case is the destruction of the union's pre-existing majority
62
Bargaining Outcomes by the Essential Characteristics of Each Case
Contract Bargaining and No contract and
obtained no contracts no bargaining
Characteristic (30 cases) (22 cases) (9 cases)
Informal settlement 53% 37% 33%
Multiple violations of L.M.R.A. 33% 40% 66%
Median size unit 11-20 11-20 1-10
Cases involving Teamsters 50% 36% 33%
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by the employer's unfair labor practices. Having lost its support in a
plant, a union's chance of securing a contract following completion
of NLRB action would appear to be negligible. Contracts in forty-
nine percent of these cases, however, may be considered prima facie
evidence of considerable NLRB success.
There is strong evidence, however, that Joy Silk bargaining or-
ders are not very effective against the strongly anti-union employer
who wages a lengthy legal battle against the union and dissipates the
union's majority through multiple violations involving discharges and
the establishment of a company-dominated union. Thus, in the thir-
teen cases where the employer committed multiple violations and lit-
igated the charges brought against him, unions succeeded in obtaining
contracts in only three cases (twenty-three percent). Does this mean
that the NLRB is but a passive agent in inducing compliance with
the law and influencing an employer to initiate a collective bargain-
ing relationship with the union involved? In other words, is a union's
ability to obtain a contract in Joy Silk situations basically dependent
on employer actions over which the Board has no real control? The
evidence suggests that this is not so.
A. Settlements
The most significant evidence that the Board's procedures in
Joy Silk situations are effective is the number of employers who elect
to adjust their cases following the issuance of an unfair labor prac-
tice charge against them. Board data indicate that sixty-six percent
of Joy Silk cases are settled, and twenty-seven of the sixty-one cases
analyzed in this study were adjusted. These cases generally involved
determined efforts to destroy the unions' position through unfair
labor practices. What, then, makes such employers settle their cases
and, in effect, agree to recognize and bargain with the union, offer
to reinstate any employee improperly discharged, cease further viola-
tions, and advise their employees of all such actions?
One possible explanation is that the union is so powerful that
the employer decides to adjust the dispute rather than risk destroy-
ing his own business. This factor may be significant in cases involv-
ing the Teamsters Union, but it is not sufficient to explain the
changed attitudes of vehemently anti-union employers opposed by
other unions, none of which have the economic power of the Team-
sters.63 It seems that in practice employers are influenced by the legal
63 The Teamsters Union was involved in 48% of all adjusted cases and in 36% of
such cases where the employer committed multiple violations.
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machinery of the NLRB. What elements, then, generate settlements?
Seventeen of the twenty-six employers who informally settled
their cases were interviewed to determine the factors that led each
to settle.64 Table 1 lists the reasons given and indicates their fre-
quency; Table 2 sets forth the various combinations in which the
reasons were given:
TABLE 1
Reason for Settling (17 Cases)
No. of times
reason mentioned Reason
7 Unwillingness to undergo litigation expenses.
10 Advice from attorney that there was little chance of winning
litigated case and that settlement was advisable.
6 Threat, or actual implementation by union, of economic action.
4 Avoidance of back-pay liability and reinstatement burden.
5 Employer reconsideration that fighting union was unnecessary.
32
TABLE 2
Reason for Settling (17 Cases)
No. of cases Reason
2 Litigation costs, reinstatement and back-pay liability,
attorney advice.
3 Litigation costs, attorney advice.
3 Attorney advice, employer reconsideration that fighting
union was unnecessary.
3 Union economic action.
1 Fighting union unnecessary.
1 Union economic power, fighting union unnecessary,
back-pay liability.
1 Union economic action, litigation costs.
1 Union economic action, attorney advice.
1 Attorney advice.
I Litigation costs, back-pay liability.
17
The tables indicate the crucial role that attorneys play in Joy Silk
settlements; attorney advice that it would be extremely difficult to
successfully contest the unfair labor practice charges was the reason
most frequently given for settling. This kind of advice is in clear
contrast to that given by attorneys who, although they do not antic-
61 Seven employers, including 5 who shut down, could not be contacted; 3 others
refused to be interviewed.
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ipate a favorable outcome, expect time to work against the union, and
advise their clients that the litigation route is the best means of
defeating the union. Two employers in this study acknowledged
that their attorneys advised them that in a two- or three-year period
of litigation the union would "die on the vine," but the extent of such
practices is extremely difficult to determine. Ten of the twenty-eight
employers who litigated and were interviewed said they followed their
attorneys' advice that the case could be won. One experienced com-
pany official remarked that many employers fail to realize that at-
torneys have a vested interest in litigating a case. Moreover, attorneys
often view an unfair labor practice case in an overly legalistic manner.
They fail to realize that the company has to live with the employees
after the case is dosed, and they discount the effect that a union-
management struggle has on employee morale and productivity. In
this particular case the management official, upon assuming his posi-
tion, dismissed the attorneys who had advised further litigation,
accepted the Trial Examiner's decision, and quickly negotiated a
contract with the union. Probably few employers act in this manner,
however; they hire attorneys for their expertise and usually act on
the basis of it.
A second factor that motivated employers to settle was their
reluctance to undergo the costs involved in litigation. This consider-
ation was mentioned in seven cases and confirmed the advice of
attorneys in five of those cases. The costs of defending and appealing
an unfair labor practice charge rest on the party charged and are
substantial. Hiring a first-class labor lawyer to argue the case through
the courts of appeal may cost from $25,000 to $50,000.65 The em-
ployer who litigates must also be ready to bear some indirect costs.
The small employer is often forced to neglect his business oper-
ations and devote his time to the planning of the legal battle; both
he and his employees are usually called upon to testify at the Trial
Examiner's hearing. Production time is lost, and in service-oriented
businesses the losses are unrecoverable. Thus the total costs involved
are sufficient to deter many from engaging in lengthy legal proceed-
ings.
The tables also indicate that four out of seventeen employers
settled to avoid back-pay and reinstatement obligations. An employer
who discriminatorily discharges or lays off workers becomes liable
65 This figure was the one most frequently mentioned by employers who litigated
their cases.
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for back pay and must offer reinstatement to the discriminatees. For
many employers, a back-pay liability can become a difficult financial
burden. In fiscal year 1965, for example, the average back-pay award
in a discharge case litigated through the courts amounted to $8,077.66
Furthermore, a strike over a refusal to recognize and bargain becomes
an unfair labor practice strike entitling the employee to reinstate-
ment.67 In such situations, the employer's freedom to hire is restricted
since he cannot offer permanent tenure to the replacements. -
It is not, however, economic and monetary considerations alone
that lead employers to settle. Five employers settled after concluding
that fighting the union was unnecessary. Many employers who ini-
tially refuse to bargain and commit unfair labor practices act out of
fear; unionization conjures up the specter of business ruin.68 Board
action, however, caused three of the five employers to reevaluate
their positions. As one employer stated, "Board action forces an em-
ployer to ask himself whether or not everything he is doing is all
right or justified." Two other employers settled upon realizing that
they would gain nothing by litigating. These two employers had in-
dependently entered into similiar master agreements covering most
of their firms' stores with the same union. Still, they resisted the
union's efforts to organize two of their newly built stores. Faced with
what they knew would be fruitless litigation procedures, however,
they agreed to bring the two new stores under the master agreements.
Tables I and 2 thus indicate that a majority of the settlements
were induced by Board action. Only six employers stated that the
threat or actual implementation of economic action made them settle,
and all of these cases involved the Teamsters Union. In three cases
the Teamsters struck following the employers' unlawful refusal to
bargain, and the signing of a contract quickly followed the settle-
ment. In the other three cases the employers said they settled to
avoid a strike or boycott. Teamsters' economic power, however, was
not the only factor in some of the cases; three of the employers men-
tioned that they were also induced to settle by reluctance to un-
dergo the costs of litigation, their attorneys' advice, their own
realization that fighting the union was unnecessary, or a desire to
limit their back-pay liability and reinstatement obligations.
66 30 NLRB ANN. REP. 183, Table 4 (July 1, 1964 to June 30, 1965).
67 NLRB v. Comfort, Inc., 365 F.2d 867, 877 (8th Cir. 1966).
68 GrrELMAN, supra note 55, at 35-36. Five of the 17 employers who informally settled
acknowledged that their initial opposition to the union was motivated by fear of the
adverse consequences of unionization.
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B. Contracts After Settlement
The objective of collective bargaining is not just negotiations
between union and employer, but the reaching of a contract. Union
success in obtaining a contract is the best index of the success of the
Board's remedial processes in Joy Silk cases.
Unions achieved contracts in sixty-seven percent of the informally
settled cases.0 9 This ability raises some interesting questions. For
effective bargaining to take place, there must be "some equality of
bargaining power." 70 Even when a case is settled, however, it is ques-
tionable whether the status quo has been fully restored. The employer
has threatened and possibly discharged union supporters, and one
may doubt whether his offer to reinstate those discharged and to bar-
gain enables the union to regain sufficient support to assert the degree
of bargaining pressure necessary for effective contract negotiations.
Thus the following questions are important: (1) To what factors can
we attribute union success in executing contracts?; and (2) are these
contracts equal to what the unions would have obtained had there
been no unfair labor practices?
To answer these questions, interviews were conducted with the
union organizers and employers involved in fourteen of the sixteen
informally settled cases in which contracts were executed. Table 3
sets forth the factors that influenced the employers to sign:
TABLE 3
Reason for Contract (Based on Employer Responses)
(Total Number of Contracts: 14)
Major factor No. of cases
Union economic power. 7
Mutual desire to sign contract:
no pressure exerted. 4
Fear of NLRB action and
union economic power. 3
14
While legal pressure assisted the unions in obtaining contracts
69 Unions obtain contracts in approximately 86% of first bargaining situations
following Board certification where no unfair labor practices have been committed.
Speech by Frank W. McCulloch, in A.B.A. SEar. OF LABOR RE-L. LAW, Aug. 1962, at 17.
Measured against this standard, improvement is needed in the informally settled cases,
although there is no question that NLRB remedial action has produced beneficial results.
70 CREATIVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 12-13 (J. Healy ed. 1965).
[Vol. 55:1
NLRB REMEDIES
in three cases,7 1 it is clear from Table 3 that unions can exert substan-
tial economic leverage against the employer in contract negotiations
when the case is informally settled. Employers mentioned union eco-
nomic strength as a reason for signing in ten of the fourteen in-
formally settled cases; in seven of these ten cases union economic
power was identified as the most important factor. In three of these
seven cases, the unions had struck; in the remaining four, employer
reluctance to risk a strike or boycott led to the signing of contracts.
The unions' ability to regain support in these cases can be attributed
to their success in obtaining bargaining rights early and the relatively
quick remedying of the other unfair labor practices. In contrast to
what occurs in litigated cases, the employees believe that their rights
are being protected; they retain their jobs and actively support the
unions' bargaining efforts.
In four cases, neither union economic power nor fear of further
NLRB action was instrumental in the employers' decision to ex-
ecute collective bargaining agreements. In these cases, both sides
acknowledged that neither had used any pressure during negotiations.72
Instead, the signing of an agreement was the result of a mutual
desire to come to a quick accommodation. These four cases represent
the culmination of the change in the employers' behavior towards
unions and collective bargaining that is first manifested in the em-
ployers' decision to settle.
The efficacy of bargaining in the informally settled case is fur-
ther demonstrated by the general success of the unions in obtaining
standardized contracts. In nine of the fourteen cases, union organ-
izers stated that the benefits obtained paralleled the unions' area stan-
dards. In five other cases, the unions acknowledged that the contracts
were substandard. The organizers admitted that the original unfair
labor practices weakened their unions' economic power and prevented
71 The obligation to bargain in good faith provided for in § 8(d) of the Taft-
Hartley Act does not require an employer to make any particular concession during
bargaining negotiations; nevertheless, the courts have held that he must make "some
reasonable effort . . . to compose his differences with the union." NLRB v. Reed &
Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134-35 (1st Cir. 1953). In this study the 3 employers came
to agreement with the unions involved to avoid further NLRB charges that they had
failed to bargain in good faith.
72 At the same time, it must be realized that the possibility of economic pressure is
a background factor in all bargaining, although it may not be employed by either side.
In these 4 cases, the unions were attempting to consolidate their position through a
contract rather than risk a strike, while the employers were seeking to eliminate the
ill-will and distrust that built up following their initial refusal to bargain.
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their obtaining better benefits. Had there been no unfair labor prac-
tices, these unions might have obtained greater benefits, but from
this alone it does not necessarily follow that bargaining was not mean-
ingful. The organizers indicated that it was not unusual for first con-
tracts to contain fewer benefits than existing contracts. Moreover, they
said that the contracts obtained were livable and not so low as to
depress or erode union conditions elsewhere.
Eleven of the fourteen organizers involved in informally settled
contract cases stated that their relationships with the employers were
good and that they expected no difficulty in negotiating a second con-
tract. Only three, all of whose unions failed to obtain standardized
contracts, remarked that the unions' day-to-day relationship with the
employers was one of friction; they spoke of having to continually
police and enforce the contracts' terms. It appears that in these cases
the employers have not fully accepted the unions' role as bargaining
agent.
Employers generally shared the unions' view that stable collective
bargaining relationships had been established. Ten of the fourteen
employers interviewed remarked that their working relationships with
the union were good.73 Thus only for a minority of unions and em-
ployers had collective bargaining failed to produce a mutually satis-
factory relationship. The effective contractual relations which de-
veloped in the great majority of settled cases are evidence that the
bargaining order is, in such circumstances, of substantial remedial
efficacy. 74
C. Litigated Cases
Table 4 sets out the reasons for signing contracts given by eleven
employers who chose to litigate their cases:
73 In saying that their working relationships with the unions were "good," these
employers acknowledged that unionization had not caused productivity to drop or
friction to develop between management and employees; in general, it had not interfered
with the employers' general business operations. So long as the contract was followed,
little was heard from the union.
74 The failure of a stable relationship to develop following the signing of an
agreement does not necessarily indicate that a bargaining order has been ineffective.
To the author's knowledge, there is no study that indicates the degree to which contractual
agreements are followed by what may be considered a "good" working relationship
between union and employer; thus, there is no basis for comparison. On the other hand,
the evidence that in these cases a good working relationship had been established
following the signing of a contract strongly confirms the original conclusion that bargain-
ing orders, in such cases, are beneficial.
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TABLE 4
Reason for Signing Contract in Litigated Cases75
(Total Litigated Contract Cases: 11)
Reason No. of cases
Fear of further NLRB action. 6
Union economic pressure. 2
Fear of further NLRB action and 2
union economic pressure.
Mutual desire to reach agreement. 1
11
Table 4 shows that in litigated cases unions must rely more
heavily on Board pressure and are less able to exert economic pressure
than in informally settled cases. Typically, the NLRB does not close
a case until it is satisfied that the guilty party has complied with the
Board or court decision; compliance officers maintain contact with the
parties to see whether the employer is bargaining in good faith. It is
this continued surveillance76 and the specter of further litigation costs
and possible court fines77 that provide the real impetus for employers
to reach agreements with unions. In only two cases did the employers
remark that the unions' economic power was the sole reason for sign-
ing a contract.
D. Contracts After Litigation
Despite their minimal economic power in litigated cases, the
unions were still able to obtain contracts that compared favorably with
their area standards. In only four of the eleven cases did union repre-
sentatives state that the contracts executed were below par. Signifi-
cantly, these were cases where the contracts were entirely due to the
employers' fear of further NLRB action; a union's ability to use
economic pressure is probably its best guarantee of obtaining a
beneficial contract.
At the same time, the evidence also indicates that harmonious
working relationships were established between unions and employers.
75 There were 13 such cases. One employer refused to be interviewed; another had
sold his store while the case was being litigated.
76 "The Company keeps checking if I am in contact with you and I tell them that
I am reporting every meeting. Without your assistance in looking over the shoulders of
the Company, we would not get anywhere." Letter from a union organizer to one NLRB
regional attorney.
77 Should an employer be found in contempt of a court order, the court can fine
and/or imprison the employer until he complies.
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In nine of the eleven cases, union organizers felt their chances for
renewing the contracts were good. In one of the other cases the union
organizer said that the employer was still aggressively anti-union; in
the other, economic difficulties resulted in the shutdown of the or-
ganized unit. Employers in eight of the eleven cases similarly viewed
their relationships with the unions as good. One employer expressed
strongly negative opinions concerning his plant's unionization, charg-
ing the union with fomenting friction between management and the
employees, and making the employees arrogant and difficult to super-
vise. The other two employers, while not critical of the unions' role,
thought that a successful decertification election was a good possibility.
The execution of contracts and the development of productive
collective bargaining relationships in these litigated cases indicate that
the Board's remedial policies can be effective in the most difficult
Joy Silk cases. However, their effectiveness is limited. Contracts were
obtained in only thirty-eight percent of the Joy Silk situations in which
the employers litigated the cases, and they were obtained in only forty-
one percent of the cases in which multiple violations were committed.
Against this record must be measured the general ability of unions to
obtain contracts in approximately eighty-six percent of first bargain-
ing situations. Thus, while Joy Silk bargaining orders are not an exer-
cise in futility, they are not always the best that could be desired.
E. Bargaining Orders Not Followed by Contracts
No contracts were executed in thirty-one out of sixty-one, or fifty-
one percent, of the Joy Silk cases. Inability to execute a contract gen-
erally reflects the union's loss of its majority within the plant, and
in such cases the union has little choice but to relinquish its position as
bargaining agent and withdraw from the plant. The bargaining order
requires the employer to bargain with the union for a reasonable time
only;78 if no agreement is reached and the employer has evidence that
the union is not the majority representative, the employer may then
terminate his recognition of the union. It is generally quite easy for
an employer to withdraw recognition; in many cases, it is the em-
ployees themselves who ask the union to leave the plant.
In assessing the degree to which the ineffectiveness of Board bar-
gaining orders as remedial devices are responsible for the union's
inability to obtain a contract in a Joy Silk case, it must be remembered
that a union's failure may result from other factors. Board records
indicate that fourteen percent of all newly certified unions do not ob-
78 NLR-B v. Loworn, 172 F.2d 293, 294-95 (5th Cir. 1949).
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tain contracts even in situations where employers have not committed
any unfair labor practices. Plant shutdowns, a union's lack of economic
power, and employee dissatisfaction with union leadership can all
prevent a union from obtaining an agreement.
The thirty-one cases where unions failed to obtain contracts may
be divided into two groups for analytic purposes: (1) cases where, fol-
lowing a bargaining order, no bargaining occurred; and (2) cases where
bargaining occurred but no contract was obtained.
There were nine cases in which unions did not even attempt to
negotiate a contract following a bargaining order. In four of these
cases the employer had shut down. In the other five cases, the em-
ployers committed complex violations-in addition to committing
8(a)(1) violations, the employers discharged union supporters-and in
four of these cases the employers litigated the charges against them.
In one typical case, involving a unit of five employees, the employer
refused to bargain and discharged the three union adherents. The dis-
charged employees declined reinstatement, and their replacements dis-
claimed any interest in the union. After the bargaining order was
issued, the union organizers called a meeting of employees to draw up
contract proposals, but these meetings drew little response from the
employees. Thus no bargaining occurred because the union organizers
felt that their loss of support, stemming from the employer's illegal
acts, would have made bargaining useless.
An examination of the remaining tventy-two cases where the
unions bargained with employers, but failed to obtain contracts, reveals
that Joy Silk bargaining orders and settlement agreements are not fully
adequate as remedial devices. Again the unions' failure to obtain con-
tracts was not always due to the ineffectiveness of the Board's processes;
in five cases the unions did not achieve contracts because of other fac-
tors.7
9
In seventeen cases, however, the union organizers claimed that
they were unable to obtain contracts primarily because they had lost
support among the employees by the time the Board bargaining orders
were issued. Fifteen of these cases involved either litigation or multiple
79 In one case, a plant shut down for economic reasons. In another, the company was
unable to pay the union rate, and the union, rather than risk undermining union con-
tracts elsewhere, broke off negotiations. In two cases, the employees were unskilled and
lacked economic power to strike effectively; in a third case, the employees refused to ratify
a contract agreed upon by both union and employer. The union agent in this case ex-
plained that while the contract closely paralleled union standards for the industry, the
employees believed they should have gotten more. This is one of only two cases where the
union's failure to obtain a contract did not result in the union's demise. The union is
supported by a majority and expects to obtain a contract soon.
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violations of the Act, and five involved both. In nine cases the em-
ployers acknowledged that the unions made no economic threats; in
three others strikes were attempted but failed. 80 Aware of the unions'
inability to back up their demands through economic pressure and
feeling under no obligation to reach a contract,81 the employers as-
sumed, according to the union organizers, a "take-it-or-leave-it" policy.
Negotiations were doomed from the start.
In such a situation unions face the difficult choice of abandoning
the plant or accepting seriously substandard contracts. Like most
unions, the unions here chose the first route as the lesser of two evils.
A substandard union contract will undermine contract conditions
throughout the locality. Furthermore, competing employers whose
employees are represented by the same union could be expected to
protest vigorously the union's granting of a low-cost contract to a
competitor.
It is evident that there are some employers who seek to destroy
a union's majority status via the unfair labor practice and litigation
routes, notwithstanding the legal sanctions brought against them.8 2 Of
the twenty-eight employers in this study who litigated their cases and
were interviewed, thirteen acknowledged that they litigated against
the advice of their attorneys, because they found it advantageous to do
so. The first advantage accruing to the employer is that during the
time the case is being litigated he is able to maintain the status quo in
the plant. The savings he acquires by not operating under a union
contract reduce his actual litigation costs. 83 Second, the employer who
litigates is able to deduct his legal costs from his taxable income, as a
business expense; back pay is similarly deductible. Finally, and perhaps
most significantly, the employer knows that in litigating he buys time
during which the union's chances of survival decrease. 84 Thus for many
employers, the process of litigation becomes a business proposition.
80 Three employers would not discuss their cases, and two could not be contacted.
81 Nine employers indicated that their bargaining strategy was grounded upon the
demand that the union accept without significant modification their first offer. As
one employer remarked: "Good faith bargaining under the law did not require the
company to sign anything or enter into an agreement. Our strategy was to wear them
out and we did."
82 The Pucinski Committee charged that the expanding caseload of unfair labor
practices and the resulting delay are in part attributable to attorneys who counsel
their employer clients to engage in unfair labor practices as a means of destroying union
organization.
83 One employer stated: "For five years I was able to run the business without even
talking or negotiating in any way with the union. This itself saved me $100,000."
81 One extremely anti-union employer who litigated his case through the court of
appeals stated that he wrote 1,000 employers counseling them that litigation is the surest
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This is not to suggest that all employers coldly calculate the costs
of fighting the union and decide that keeping the union out will, in
the long run, save the company money. Some employers are ideologi-
cally opposed to unions and would under no circumstances recognize
a union; for some, a shutdown would be preferable. The question is
who shall wield power and authority, and in such a conflict relative
costs are not determinative. Keeping the union out is the objective,
and the employers realize that the unfair labor practice and litigation
routes are the most efficacious means of doing so.s5
In cases involving such employers, Joy Silk bargaining orders are
inadequate remedial devices. In roughly one-third of the Joy Silk cases
examined in this study, unions were unsuccessful in obtaining con-
tracts, primarily because of their inability, following employer unfair
labor practices, to regain support among employees. The Board's bar-
gaining orders failed to restore the status quo-the union's majority
status and the bargaining position it enjoyed prior to the employer's
unlawful refusal to bargain and his accompanying unfair labor prac-
tices. Thus, in certain circumstances, a bargaining order must be
supplemented by additional remedies to restore the union to the posi-
tion it occupied prior to the employer's illegal acts.
IV
PROPOSED REMEDIES AND SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS
This study has indicated that Joy Silk bargaining orders are of
weak remedial efficacy in situations where the employer has committed
multiple violations and then litigated the charges against him. The
problem of developing effective remedies is further complicated when
the union lacks economic power, adequate financial and human re-
sources, and attempts to organize a very small unit. This section will
discuss new remedies and new approaches that should enable the Board
more effectively to remedy the violations of the Joy Silk employer.
A. Reinstatement of Discriminatees in the Joy Silk Case
The Joy Silk bargaining order has been shown to be least effective
where the employer discharges union supporters.8 0 The major reason
means of preventing a union from ever obtaining representative status. He added that by
increasing the NLRB's already swollen docket, the increasing backlog of cases would soon
make the law unworkable.
85 This may explain why an employer with a unit of only two employees will undergo
heavy litigation costs to prevent the unionization of those two employees.
86 See text accompanying notes 19 through 29 supra.
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for this is that the reinstatement remedy operates inadequately; the
realities of industrial employment often frustrate the Board's efforts
to reinstate discriminatees. It is only normal that, once discharged, a
discriminatee will be reluctant to return to his former position. Hav-
ing obtained a new job, the average worker will not risk further
economic injury through reinstatement. His natural inclination to
reject reinstatement is solidified if he has obtained a better position
since his discharge.87
The discriminatee's failure to return signifies the Board's failure
to restore the status quo. The consequences are notorious. Aspin re-
ported that unions generally fail to win representation elections in
cases where a discriminatee refuses reinstatement;"" this study demon-
strates that a dischargee's failure to return seriously impairs the
union's chances of gaining a contract. The discriminatee's failure to
return forcefully discloses to the remaining employees the price they
may pay for supporting the union. In such cases, a bargaining order
is often futile.
In Joy Silk cases where a discriminatee refuses to be reinstated,
the union rather than the employer should have the authority to select
the discriminatee's replacement.8 9 This remedy would enable the
union to regain its original level of support, and prevent the employer
from creating an anti-union majority. Furthermore, defections from
the ranks of union supporters would be lessened as employees observed
that the employer was unable to profit from his unfair labor practices.
The employees' fear of their own illegal dismissal would, to some ex-
tent, be allayed by their knowledge that the employer's predisposition
to engage in further discharges would probably be curtailed by his in-
ability to exploit this weapon. Coupled with a bargaining order, the
new remedy would help restore the union to the position it enjoyed
prior to the employer's illegal campaign.
The Board has the authority to provide this remedy. Section 10(c)
of the Act, which provides that the Board "shall issue and cause to be
served . . . an order requiring such person to cease and desist from
such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action includ-
87 Aspin, supra note 20, at 16-17, 24, 43.
88 Id. at 78-79.
89 Naturally this remedy can be applied only in cases in which the union is able to
select qualified replacements; the employer should be under no obligation to hire an un-
qualified worker. Possible conflicts between the parties over qualifications could be resolved
at the back-pay hearing. The employer should also be able to treat the union-selected
replacements in the same manner that he would have treated the original discriminatees
had they returned. The issue of dual loyalty can be completely eliminated by a Board
regulation that no union-selected replacements could be on the union payroll.
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ing reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effec-
tuate the policies of this [Act],"' 0 gives the Board broad powers to
remedy unfair labor practices. The courts have recognized the wide
latitude the Board has in remedying employer violations. In vesting
the Board with power to order affirmative relief, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that
Congress could not catalogue all the devices and stratagems for
circumventing the policies of the Act. Nor could it define the whole
gamut of remedies to effectuate these policies in an infinite variety
of specific situations. Congress met these difficulties by leaving the
adaptation of means to end to the empiric process of administra-
tion.91
Similarly, in NLPLB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., the Supreme Court de-
clared that "[i]n fashioning remedies to undo the effects of violations
of the Act, the Board must draw on enlightenment gained from ex-
perience."92 The only limitations on the Board's authority are that its
orders be remedial and not "punitive," and that they be appropriate
to the particular situation before the Board. By the term "punitive"
the courts have generally meant a remedy that goes beyond an attempt
to restore the status quo existing before the unfair labor practice.93
What are the possible challenges to the new reinstatement remedy?
It will be argued that this remedy inflicts punitive sanctions upon an
employer, since allowing the union to select a discriminatee's replace-
ment violates the employer's traditional prerogative of hiring his em-
ployees. Moreover, the remedy goes, beyond restoring the status quo,
since this can be accomplished only by reinstatement of the discrim-
inatee. It may also be contended that while reinstatement is designed
only to relieve an injured employee, ordering the employer to hire an
employee selected by the union serves only to bolster the union's posi-
tion. These arguments, however, are not persuasive. First, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that the language of section 10(c) does not
90 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964) (emphasis added).
91 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
Because the character of the Statute is "essentially remedial," it can be no
more effective than its implementing remedies. The administrators of the law and
others who share their desire to carry out its policies can do no less than con-
stantly evaluate and reevaluate the remedies of the Labor Act in the light of ex-
perience, changing drcumstances, and the insights of scholarship.
McCulloch, New Remedies Under the National Labor Relations Act, in PRocEamNGs or
THE N.Y.U. TWENTY-SEcoND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 223, 242 (1969).
92 344 US. 344, 346 (1953).
93 "The Board must establish that the remedy is a reasonable attempt to put aright
matters the unfair labor practice set awry." Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651,
658 (1961) (concurring opinion).
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restrict reinstatement to those discriminatorily discharged. In Phelps
Dodge Corporation v. NLRB94 the Court declared that the Board's
power "to order an opportunity for employment does not derive from
the phrase 'including reinstatement of employees with or without
back pay,' and is not limited by it."95 Instead, the Board's remedial
authority is based on the congressional mandate to take "affirmative
action" that "will effectuate the purposes of the Act." 90 •
The Supreme Court has also recognized that the employer's right
to hire and. discharge is not absolute and may be restricted to remedy
his unfair labor practices. In upholding the constitutionality of the
Wagner Act, the Court said that "[t]he Act does not interfere with the
normal exercise of the right of the employer to select its employees or
to discharge them.O'T The employer who refuses to recognize a union
representing a majority of his employees and who discharges union
supporters, however, creates an extralegal and abnormal situation. In
hiring replacements for the discriminatees refusing reinstatement, the
employer is not exercising his normal right to hire but is, in effect,
exploiting his violations of the law.
Moreover, this remedy cannot be rejected on the grounds it does
not restore the status quo or fulfill the purpose of reinstatement. Re-
instatement is not only a remedy for the particular employee dis-
charged but is also an attempt to lessen the discharge's effects on the
remaining employees. To limit reinstatement to the particular em-
ployee is in many cases to deny a remedy. A discriminatee's concern
for his economic security will often result in rejection of the reinstate-
ment offer. Furthermore, in replacing the discharged union supporter,
the employer dramatically refutes the union and the Board's claim to
protect the employees; he demonstrates to all the continued peril in-
volved in supporting the union. Consequently, the restoration of the
status quo-the reestablishment of the union's bargaining position
and the elimination of the discharge's intimidating effect upon the
employees-requires that the Board extend the scope of its reinstate-
ment remedy. It should authorize unions to replace discharged union
supporters.
Ordering a Joy Silk employer to hire union-selected replacements
would not violate the closed-shop prohibitions of the Act. Possibly
the union-selected replacements would all be union members, but this
94 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
95 Id. at 191.
90 Id. at 188.
97 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937) (emphasis added).
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alone does not constitute the formation of a closed shop, in which
union membership is a prerequisite to all jobs in the plant. The
union's authority to select employee replacements'would apply only
to the former jobs of the discriminatees and in no way restrict the
employer in hiring whomever he chooses to fill other jobs. The remedy
has no effect on the employer's normal employment policies.
B. Use of the 10(j) Injunction
This study has also indicated that the time delay involved in
deciding a case seriously cripples the union's bargaining position. By
the time a bargaining order is issued, the union may have no one for
whom to bargain. Under section 10(j) of the Act, however, the Board
has discretionary authority to seek interim relief from the federal
courts as soon as a violation has occurred. 98 In issuing a 10() injunc-
tion in a Joy Silk case, a court could order the immediate reinstate-
ment of discriminatees and compel the employer to cease all violations
and bargain with the union. The argument in support of this 10()
procedure is that it preserves the status quo-the union's bargaining
position--during the lengthy interval between the issuance of the com-
plaint and the Board or court decision.
Presently, Board use of the 10() injunction procedure is running
at a snail's pace. Although the NLRB makes a point of publicizing its
activities in this field, it is an understatement to say that the 10(j)
procedure has been sparingly used.99 In 1967, unions and regional di-
rectors requested 10(j) relief in 164 employer unfair labor practice
cases; the Board authorized the General Counsel to seek 10(j) injunc-
tions against employers in twenty-two cases.'00 Furthermore, nearly all
of the Board's attempts to obtain 10() injunctions in refusal-to-bargain
cases were made in cases where the employer had refused to bargain
with an already certified union rather than in Joy Silk cases. In light
of the way in' which delays in Joy Silk proceedings prejudice the
98 Section 10(j) provides that "[t]he Board shall have power, upon issuance of con-
plaint . . . charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor
practice, to petition any United States district court ... for appropriate temporary relief
or restraining order."
For a suggestion that the Board make more liberal use of the 100) injunction pro-
cedure, see Hearings on General Study Into the Procedures of the NLRB and Its Ad-
ministration of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 as Amended Before the
Subcomm. on National Labor Relations Board of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 87th cong., Ist Sess. 53 (1961).
D9 Chairman McCulloch has referred to the Board's expanded use of the 10(j) pro-
cedure in his speeches. See McCulloch, supra note 91, at 137.
100 Id.
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unions' efforts, and because employers might be induced to settle their
union disputes when faced with an injunction,1 1 the 10(j) remedy
should be given greater consideration in Joy Silk disputes.
In Joy Silk cases where the unit is large and the employer chal-
lenges the validity of a great number of authorization cards, the Board's
reluctance to use the 10(j) procedure is perhaps justified. The difficulty
of proving to a court's satisfaction that the union had obtained a ma-
jority of valid authorization cards could tax the Board considerably.
Most Joy Silk cases do not present this difficulty, however. In many
cases the employer never challenges the validity of the authorization
cards: this was the situation in twenty-four of the sixty-one cases in
this study. Furthermore, the unit in the Joy Silk case is typically small;
the median unit size in the sixty-one cases studied here was eleven to
twenty employees. Consequently, even if the employer were to chal-
lenge the validity of the cards, the Board's burden in proving that
the cards reflected the employees' preferences would not be so impos-
ing as to preclude the injunction procedure.
There is a basic inconsistency in the Board's exercise of its dis-
cretionary authority to seek 10(j) injunctive relief. Under section 10(l),
the Board is not required to petition for injunctive relief against
unions in section 8(b)(4)(D) cases, which involve jurisdictional dis-
101 This view is held by Chairman McCulloch. Speaking of a 10(j) injunction, he
stated that "[ilt is not uncommon in these as in other cases for the Board's institution
of extraordinary action to precipitate settlements or agreements to end alleged unlawful
conduct pending final decision." McCulloch, An Evaluation of the Remedies Available to
the NLRB-Is There Need for Legislative or Administrative Change?, 15 LAs. LJ. 755, 760
(1964). The following table indicates that during the period 1964-68, the Board was either
granted a 10j) injunction or was able to obtain a settlement agreement in 66% of the
cases in which it requested 10(j) relief:
Disposition of Board Requests for 10(j) Relief
No. of cases in
No. of injunction No. of cases in No. of cases in which request
Fiscal cases disposed of which injunction which settlements was withdrawn
year by courts was granted were obtained or denied
1964 11 5 2 4
1965 15 5 3 7
1966 9 7 2 0
1967 21 11 4 6
1968 15 5 3 7
71 33 14 24
NLRB ANNUAL REPoRTs, Table 20. This success in seeking 10(j) injunctions in all unfair
labor practice cases suggests the potential for more vigorous prosecution of 10(j) relief in
Joy Silk cases.
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putes; 10 2 yet it routinely does so. In fiscal year 1966, for example, the
Board sought forty-nine injunctions under section 10(1) in jurisdic-
tional-dispute cases. This figure is more than three times the number
of 10(j) injunctions sought by the Board in all employer unfair labor
practice cases. Thus the Board routinely exercises its discretion to ob-
tain injunctive relief in union unfair labor practice cases but withholds
it in cases of employer violations which, in the Joy Silk case, are often
of the most flagrant nature.
Empirical evidence concerning a similar procedure indicates that
the issuance of a 10(j) injunction would increase the unions' chances
of obtaining contracts in Joy Silk cases. A study of unlawful refusal-to-
bargain cases in which consent decrees were issued shows that unions
achieved contracts in forty-eight percent of the cases; by way of con-
trast, contracts are reached in only thirty-four percent of the litigated
cases.' 03 A consent-decree case is one in which the employer consents
to a court decree enforcing the settlement. This type of settlement is
the only one the Board will enter into with an employer whom it feels
is likely to violate the normal informal settlement agreement; failure
to comply with the decree is punishable as contempt. Thus in the
consent-decree case, as in the 10(j) case, the employer bargains with
the union under the constraint of court action. The consent-decree
case also resembles a 10(j) case with respect to the element of time; in
contrast to the litigated case, both can normally be closed in the space
of months. The similarity of the two procedures suggests that increased
use of the 10(j) injunction would enhance the unions' chances of ob-
taining contracts in Joy Silk cases.
C. Compensatory Relief
The Board now has under consideration four refusal-to-bargain
cases in which unions request a new remedy 0 4 The unions have sug-
102 Section 10() provides that "[i]n situations where such relief [injunctive] is appro-
priate the procedure specified herein shall apply to charges with respect to [section 8(b)
(4)(D)]." The Board thus has the discretion to decide in jurisdictional-dispute cases
whether or not injunctive relief is "appropriate" and should be sought. The Board does
not have this discretion in secondary boycott, recognitional and organizational picketing,
and hot cargo cases. Id.
103 Ross, supra note 31, at 115-16. Ross himself drew the opposite conclusion from
his data. In a summary of his findings, he stated that "unions armed with consent decrees
did not gain more contracts than were obtained after prolonged litigation." Id. at 31.
This author feels, however, that Ross's statement in his summary is in clear opposition
to the data Ross himself has presented at 115-16.
104 Ex-Cell-O Corp., 25-Ca-2377; Zinke's Food, Inc., 30-Ca-400; Herman Wilson Lum-
ber Co., 26-Ca-2536; Rasco Olympia Inc., 19-Ca-3187.
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gested that an employer who refuses to bargain collectively be required
to compensate his employees for the financial injury they have sus-
tained as a result of the employer's failure to bargain.
The argument for the remedy makes two basic assumptions:
(1) Unions generally obtain contracts in cases where the employer
recognizes and bargains in good faith with the union, and (2) collec-
tive bargaining generally results in increased benefits to the employees.
Granting the assumptions, the employer's refusal to bargain inflicts
monetary losses upon the union's members, which should be compen-
sated. Existing evidence supports these assumptions. Board data indi-
cate that unions obtain contracts in eighty-six percent of the first
bargaining situations when employers have not committed any unfair
labor practices. Nearly all of the union organizers in this study who
obtained contracts reported that the contracts provided for increased
economic benefits. Significantly, the unions achieved this success
despite the loss in bargaining power caused by the employers' unfair
labor practices.
The difficulty of choosing an objective standard that the Board
could use to calculate the amount of benefits lost by employees as a
result of the employer's refusal to bargain is not insuperable. A
reasonable estimate of the employees' losses could be obtained by
(1) using Bureau of Labor Standards data on average wage and benefit
increases granted in collective bargaining for the period in question;
(2) comparing the benefits offered by respondent's firm during the
case's adjudication with the average increases secured by unions in
firms similar to respondent's in regard to location, size, and industry;
or (3) combining these methods.105
A compensatory remedy would be valuable in Joy Silk cases. As
this study has shown, union chances of obtaining contracts in litigated
cases are minimal. While the case is being litigated, the union loses the
support of many employees who become dissatisfied with the union's
inability to fulfill its promises; following the issuance of a bargaining
order, efforts to reconvince employees that their support of the union
will bring them tangible economic gains are often futile. Implement-
ing this remedy should help correct the situation. Compensating em-
ployees for the losses they sustain as a result of the employer's failure
105 The proposed remedy would probably not apply in cases where the employer was
a high-wage employer; i.e., one whose wage and fringe benefits exceeded or paralleled
those offered in unionized firms. This discussion quite evidently has barely skimmed the
surface of the many problems associated with this remedy. The writer's major purpose,
however, is to relate this remedy to the difficulties the Board faces in remedying the vio-
lations of the Joy Silk employer.
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to bargain would demonstrate that the NLRB and the union can
protect their interests. Consequently, employees would be more in-
clined to support the union during the litigation period and in con-
tract negotiations. The remedy would thus make the employees whole
for their losses and enhance the union's chances of executing contracts
in the litigated Joy Silk cases.
Additionally, such a remedy is necessary to eradicate a situation
in which the present ineffectiveness of Board sanctions invites deter-
mined employer efforts to violate their duty to bargain. Of the twenty-
eight employers who litigated, thirteen acknowledged that litigation
was pursued because of its accompanying advantages-savings in labor
costs resulting from not having to implement a union contract and
the destruction of the union's support within the plant. A bargaining
order alone is ineffective because, to paraphrase Professor Chamber-
lain, an employer's willingness to abide by the law depends on the
costs involved in violating the law relative to the costs of compliance. 08
By eliminating the profit that the Joy Silk employer accrues from his
law-breaking, the compensatory remedy would significantly increase
the relative cost of his anti-union campaign. Under such circumstances
many of the most inveterate anti-union employers might be dissuaded
from violating their obligation to bargain collectively.
To be sure, Board acceptance of these proposals would generate
much controversy. 07 The fear of being labeled pro-labor or pro-man-
agement, however, should not deter the Board from critically exam-
ining the effectiveness of its present remedial policies and from
fashioning new remedies to correct existing inadequacies. Only by
pursuing such a policy can the Board fulfill its mandate to protect and
promote the collective bargaining process.
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BoARD REMEDIES IN Joy Silk CASES-
A SuMMARY VIEw
One commentator has written that "[t]here is reason to believe
that economic considerations, economic strength, and not the processes
of the NLRB, ultimately will resolve almost every labor-management
108 N. CHABERIAIN, THE LABOR SECTOR 231 (1965).
107 It should be emphasized that these measures would come into effect only after
an employer had refused to bargain and attempted to destroy the union's majority. Hence
they would in no way alter the balance of bargaining power or interfere with the activities
of either unions or employers who were lawfully engaged in the collective bargaining
process.
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quarrel that comes before the NLRB."'' 18 This article strongly suggests
that the above statement is incorrect or, at best, a misleading generali-
zation. Economic considerations do have a significant effect on the
outcome of labor-management disputes; in approximately one-half of
the Joy Silk cases studied here in which unions executed contracts, the
union's economic power was a decisive element in the employer's
willingness to negotiate a contract. But as the figure itself indicates,
this is only half the picture. In the other half of the cases in which
unions obtained contracts, the legal sanctions of the Board's remedial
processes provided the basic impetus for the employers to reach agree-
ments. Union reliance on the efficacy of the Board's remedial processes
was especially strong among non-Teamsters unions whose loss of ma-
jority support generally precluded their taking effective economic ac-
tion. In the litigated cases, even the Teamsters had to rely on the
efficacy of Board pressures to successfully negotiate contracts.
This study, therefore, has shown that the Board exercises con-
siderable influence over the actions and attitudes of employers. The
Board's legal sanctions inhibit the majority of employers from engag-
ing in multiple violations and extensive litigation; in approximately
two-thirds of all Joy Silk cases, settlements are attained. These Board-
generated settlements form the basic foundation for a union's later
success in obtaining a contract. The effectiveness of the Board's re-
medial processes is further made evident by the development of
mutually satisfactory contractual relations in the great majority of the
cases in which contracts were executed.
On the other hand, the success of the Board's remedial policies
is not complete. Among employers who violate section 8(a)(5) by refus-
ing to recognize a majority union, there is the "hard-nosed 33-1/3 per-
cent" willing to go to extreme lengths to defeat the union despite legal
sanctions. A bargaining order in Joy Silk cases involving such em-
ployers will generally prove futile. Here the Board must intervene
with new remedies; the need for new remedies is most acute where
an employer who litigates multiple unfair labor practice charges is
opposed by a union lacking adequate financial and economic power
to resist the employer's violations.
The Board can act now to strengthen its remedial policies in Joy
Silk cases. By expanding its utilization of the 10(j) injunction pro-
cedure, by providing for compensatory relief, and by broadening its
standard reinstatement remedy, the Board can both limit the effect of
108 Graham, How Effective is the National Labor Relations Board?, 48 MINN. L. REV.
1009, 1046 (1964).
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and discourage the illegal actions of the Joy Silk employer. In so doing,
the Board would be meeting its responsibility to protect and promote
the collective bargaining process.
APPENDIX
Joy Silk CASES BY METHOD OF CLOSING AND EXTENT OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
FORMAL AND INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS
No. U.L.P. 8(a)(1) 8(a)(3) 8(a)(1)(3) 8(a)(1)(2) 8(a)(2)
Total 2 12 2 10 1 = 27
Contracts 2 8 1 5 1 = 17
Trial Examiner's Decision
No. U.L.P. 8(a)(1) 8(a)(3) 8(a)(1)(3) 8(a)(1)(2) 8(a)(2)
Total 2 1 = 3
Contracts 2 0 - 2
Board Orders
No. U.L.P. 8(a)(1) 8(a)(3) 8(a)(1)(3) 8(a)(1)(2) 8(a)(2)
Total 7 1 4 2 1 = 15
Contracts 4 0 2 0 0 = 6
Court Decrees
8(a)(1) 8(a)(3) 8(a)(1)(3) 8(a)(1)(2) 8(a)(2) 8(a)(1)(2)(3)
Total 9 1 8 3 = 16
Contracts 3 0 1 1 = 5
Joy Silk CASES By TYPE OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
No. U.L.P. 8(a)(1) 8(a)(3) 8(a)(1)(3) 8(a)(1)(2) 8(a)(2) 8(a)(1)(2)(3)
Total 2 s0 4 17 4 1 3 = 61
Contracts 2 17 1 8 1 0 1 = so
Joy Silk CASES BY METHOD OF CLOSING
Informal Formal
Settlement Settlement Trial Ex. Dec. Board Court
Total 26 1 3 17 14 = 61
Contracts 16 1 2 6 5 = 30
